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Abstract 
The concept and practices of accountability enjoy considerable interest today, 
not least due to the World Development Report WDR 2004 on service 
delivery, which formulated the ‘triangle of accountability’ - specifying relations 
between the poor, service providers, policy makers and politicians. This paper  
explores accountability starting from realities faced by the poor across 
countries and diverse institutional contexts. It is postulated that, even while the 
WDR does acknowledge the importance of clientelism and the risk of 
politicisation of policy, there is insufficient recognition – especially for the 
poor and women, but not limited to them- of the power dimensions of 
accountability, institutionalised inequalities and low claim making powers, 
access problems and the importance of bribes to get things done. Such issues 
undermine accountability mechanisms in what may be called ‘modern’ or 
formal institutional settings. The question arises as to whether there are well 
performing accountability mechanisms in more traditional/‘indigenous’ or 
informal institutions and settings, where people may (still) rely on or build on 
well established and culturally rooted accountability practices. This paper is an 
initial exploration and analysis of accountability mechanisms in a sample of 22 
‘modern’, ‘indigenous/traditional’ or ‘mixed’ institutions - and attempts to 
identify patterns of mechanisms that seem to be effective, and to assess 
conditions that may be conducive to effective accountability arrangements. 
Keywords 
Informal institutions, accountability, service delivery, poverty  
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Accountability in Formal and Informal Institutions1  
A cross country analysis 
 
1 Introduction 
The concept and practices of accountability enjoy a lot of attention these days, 
especially with the donor community. The concept, of course is not new. It 
was a topic of interest alongside efforts to combat corruption, and then 
became part of the concerns with ‘good governance’, but was treated as yet 
another concept along with other ‘principles’ such as transparency and 
responsiveness. Now that the interest in the broad and rather normative ‘good 
governance agenda’ appears to be on the decline, there is an understandable 
interest in more concrete and manageable strategies which not only target the 
state – as with many good governance components – but which relate to the 
interaction and relations between the state and society, between government 
agencies and the people they are expected to serve (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). 
One strong impetus for the catapulting of the concept into prominence was 
the 2004 World Bank World Development Report (WDR) ‘Making Services 
work for Poor People’. It included the now well known ‘triangle of 
accountability’, linking the poor, policy makers and the providers. 
While offering a useful framework for analysis and even practice, the 
framework recognises the possibility that service delivery to the poor is 
influenced or undermined where political systems are suffering from clientelist 
politics and/or corruption. This touches the heart of the matter - the poorer 
people are, the more problematic their access to (quality) services and the more 
likely that they are dependent on informal relations and channels such as  
patrons and brokers, and that the bribes they pay are large in relation to their 
incomes (de Wit and Berner, 2009; Kitscheld and Wilkinson 2007). Donor 
agencies – focusing on poverty reduction and the MDGs - are increasingly 
aware of such problems, and have been exploring ways to overcome them 
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Strengthening accountability 
systems seems an attractive option these days where the formal relations 
between formal governments, formal service providers and the poor are 
concerned. An example could be a municipality which has contracted out 
water supply to a private firm, and where the customer wants to complain 
about poor supply: these are official relations ostensibly ruled by contract 
between formal, or one could say ‘modern’ organisations. Issues here include 
the degree that customers have sufficient information to complain, whether 
they are aware of their entitlements, whether they have (direct) access to the 
agency etc. The problems are not new and they apply both to the rich and the 
poor. Yet they have become more complex generally, where there has been a 
                                                 
1 This paper is the outcome of a cooperation between ISS and the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs focusing on issues of accountability, ‘informal institutions’ 
and ‘informal governance’. Mr. F. Blankenberg of the Ministry was intensively 
involved in the study on which this paper is based, while bringing in documentation 
and offering forums for discussion at the Ministry (MoFa, 2007, and Blankenberg, 
2005, 2007). 
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shift towards ‘governance’ and the recognition that governments are not the 
sole actors in arenas of planning and policy implementation. Indeed, the 
dominance of neo-liberal ideology and its emphasis on a small state has 
contributed to a proliferation of what are called non-state ‘policy stakeholders’ 
under banners such as New Public Management and the privatisation or 
contracting out of services. All this has made accountability systems more 
complicated as the numbers of actors have multiplied, along with the number 
of principal-agent relationships (Baud and de Wit, 2008, Swyngedouw, 2005)  
However, there are plenty systems and arrangements where people – 
especially the poor – are in fact strongly linked to less formal organisations, on 
which they rely for services, their security or justice on more informal systems. 
We are referring here to what one may call ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ 
organisations or institutions, which may be quite important in many countries. 
Just like in case of the ‘accountability’ concept, there is also increasing interest 
in the latter organisations, sometimes called ‘informal’ institutions to 
distinguish them from formal or ‘modern’ institutions (de Wit, 2006, 
Oosterwaal, 2004, AnanthPur, 2004, ECA/Economic Commission for Africa, 
2007, and, earlier by Dia, 1996). The question arises as to how accountability is 
organised in such informal indigenous institutions and between traditional 
service providers and their ‘customers’. What is the nature of such institutions? 
Can we actually (still) identify ‘pure’ cases of indigenous institutions or have 
they all adjusted (been articulated) to dominant ‘formal’ and ‘modern’ 
institutions – so that perhaps a dominant form is a hybrid one, or ‘mixed’ 
institutions?  Or is it better to move away from such categorisation and 
consider these as continuums on a scale from ‘formal’ to ‘informal’? Can we 
learn from such institutions and, if so, can such lessons be applied to policies, 
projects and organisations which are supported by donor agencies? And finally, 
how do these institutions compare - what are the underlying factors and 
patterns which may explain where accountability systems work, and where 
these do not work, across a variety of types and contexts.  
To make analysis possible, this paper is based on secondary data including 
a number of case studies across developing and transition countries – both 
formal/modern ones, indigenous ones and mixed types.2  The paper starts, in 
the next chapter, by defining accountability, and attempts to make distinctions 
between ‘formal’ and ‘traditional’ institutions, which are seen as different from 
‘informal’ institutions and relations- but there are also overlaps, as in the case 
of patronage. It will be argued that the latter institutions are normally more 
important for the poor than for the rich, as the poor face severe problems to 
get access to or proper treatment from  formal ones (Narayan, 2000). Chapter 
three links the former concepts and perspectives to current donor perceptions 
and practice, by presenting evidence on patterns and practices relating to 
accountability from donors agencies and to specific areas such gender 
accountability. The practices by donors to deal with what we call indigenous 
institutions are finally assessed: have they linked to them; neglected them or 
                                                 
2 The core of the research has included the collection by Mr. Akinyoade of 22 cases 
(see annex) which bring out relevant dimensions of accountability, and their 
subsequent analysis. 
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even revived them? Chapters four to six then deal respectively with 
accountability experiences in formal institutions, informal institutions, and 
what will be shown to be the most prominent type which are institutions 
having both formal and indigenous elements. Some conclusions are drawn in 
chapter seven, where patterns of success and failure are presented, and issues 
relating to accountability summarised.   
2 Defining Accountability 
Already before, but especially following the influential WDR of 2004, there 
was ample attention for the concept of accountability. The WDR (2003:85) 
indicates that there is a rapid growth of citizen initiatives, where (organised 
groups of) people increasingly demand accountability, termed ‘a new 
accountability agenda’. It focuses on the concept in relation to the scope for 
the poor to hold accountable those who provide them services such as water, 
education and health ‘in short, the key is to enhance the power of poor clients 
in service provision’(ibid.: p64). So while much is written about accountability, 
the use of the concept ‘in diverse development discourses remains loose and 
under-specific as a result of the essentially contested nature of the term and the 
political agendas that it is used to advance’ (Newel, 2006:40). Newel correctly 
argues that the issue of power is at the heart of accountability debates, power 
to define accountability, and power to create and enforce the mechanisms of 
accountability (ibid.:55). 
Schedler et al (1999) argue that traditional notions of political 
accountability are derived from the responsibilities of delegated individuals in 
public office to carry out specific tasks on behalf of citizens. In the modern 
state, with the growth of bureaucracies, the lines of political accountability have 
become blurred, making traditional concepts more difficult to apply.  
Mechanisms of political accountability can be both horizontal and vertical.  
The former amount to self-imposed accountability within the state machinery 
and the latter is that which is demanded from below by citizens and civil 
society groups.  For effectiveness, horizontal accountability should be 
accompanied by strong vertical accountability in which citizens, mass media 
and civil associations are in a position to scrutinise public officials and 
government practice.   
This paper will mostly focus3 then on what is termed vertical 
accountability, defined as the process of holding persons or organisations 
responsible for performance as objectively as possible (Paul, 2002:1). 
Accountability is related to democracy: the task to hold a government (or for 
example a city corporation) to account has been delegated to elected 
representatives. This then raises the question as to the quality of democracy - 
or, concretely, the extent to which elected representatives actually represent the 
interests, and voice the grievances and complaints of the all the people they 
ostensibly represent, and/or who voted for them. 
                                                 
3 Even while some cases analysed later relate to horizontal accountability internal to 
the Eastern African Police Force. 
 8
Accountability has two dimensions: having to provide information about 
one’s actions (answerability) and having to suffer penalties from those 
dissatisfied either with the actions themselves or with the rationale invoked to 
justify them (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005) The latter authors distinguish between 
the accountability target (the one to whom power has been delegated, the 
agent), and the accountability seekers (the principles); ‘many people seeking 
accountability do so without a clear legal standing as principals’ (ibid: 10).  
Goetz and Jenkins (2005:4) list five questions which embody the defining 
features of what they call the new accountability agenda: Who is seeking 
accountability? From whom (or what) is accountability sought? Where (in what 
forums and over what extent of geographic coverage) is accountability sought? 
How (through what means) are the powerful held to account? And: For what 
(which actions, and against which norms) is accountability being sought? 
2.1 Formal, ‘modern’ systems 
The concept of accountability holds the promise then that the public can hold 
policy makers and politicians accountable – assuming some mutual 
understanding, listening to each other, if not respect. Concrete (modern, 
formal) accountability mechanisms in the formal sphere include (cf. Paul, 
2002:6-8, Goetz and Jenkins, 2005): report cards; citizen charters; right to 
information laws, e-governance in several countries (e.g. India), mobile phones, 
internet, ombudsmen, watchdog committees (Bolivia), and elected 
representatives as already mentioned. However, accountability is often 
hampered by an overall lack of information: one of the problems that citizens 
face in addressing service-related issues is their lack of knowledge and 
information on these matters. They end up protesting and writing to the press 
on an anecdotal basis that may solve some individual problems but that do not 
solve the systemic problems in service provision (Paul, 2002). Accountability is 
also linked to claim making power and entitlements. In contemporary usage, 
the notion is about ‘applying checks, oversight and institutional constraints on 
the exercise of power’ (Schedler et al., 1999:14). According to Blair (2000), in 
order to increase the accountability of bureaucracy to elected officials and of 
elected officials to the public, measures that can be adopted include: the 
institution of regular elections, giving a voice to opposition parties, having a 
strong civil society and independent media, convening public meetings, using 
opinion surveys, and instituting formal grievance procedures. He cautions that, 
in order to achieve success, a combination of approaches is required because 
no single mechanism works on its own. The variance in the progress made in 
these countries indicates that the success of accountability measures does not 
appear to be time-dependent. 
2.2 The World Bank accountability triangle 
The WDR (2004) introduces what is called a ‘triangle of accountability’. The 
service delivery chain is seen to include three sets of actors: a) poor people, b) 
service providers or front line providers such as school teachers, doctors and 
bus drivers; and c) policy makers and politicians. The (direct) relation between 
the poor and the service provider is termed ‘the short route’. A positive 
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example could be the system of school vouchers where clients obtain the 
power of choice/ exit in relation to schools. The ‘long route’ refers to the 
relation where clients as citizens influence policy makers, and policy makers 
influence providers- and this relationship also includes the link between poor 
people and politicians - who are ultimately responsible and who could be voted 
out of power if they fail to safeguard proper administration or service delivery. 
The WDR recognises that poor people often have little influence over 
politicians, and that public services ‘often become the currency of political 
patronage and clientelism’ (ibid.:7). The relation between policy makers and 
providers is termed ‘a compact’, or contract. The report appears to assume that 
in many cases there is a separation between the policy maker and the provider; 
it may of course happen often that one agency (e.g. a municipality as governed 
by politicians/ the municipal councillors) both formulates policy while also 
implementing it. This would be the case when the municipality itself is in 
charge of water supply and solid waste management. However, as indicated, 
policy making and policy implementation are/ have been increasingly 
separated, for example under New Public Management approaches and as a 
result of neo-liberal type market focused approaches including contracting out 
modalities. This, itself raises further questions as to accountability where the 
number of providers multiplies and the question as to ultimate responsibility 
may be increasingly unclear for citizens (Swyngedouw, 2005). 
 
 
Even while the accountability triangle has given a welcome boost to thinking 
about accountability, it has also met with criticism, which may be briefly 
captured here already: 
 It neglects divisions amongst the poor and marginalised, specifically the 
fact that women are often unable to obtain access to service providers 
(ibid.); 
 It assumes a pro-active, demanding attitude of assertiveness vis-à-vis the 
service provider and/or policy maker/politician, while it is possible that 
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many poor people take a rather more accepting or sometimes even 
fatalistic attitude as regards services, and that they may be rather slow in 
complaining or demanding change (but this needs further scrutiny based 
on case-by-case research); 
 The report acknowledges patron-client relationships and the important 
fact of service delivery in exchange of votes, but it neglects corruption and 
the critical fact that bribes are often - if not normally - demanded by 
service providers to obtain a service in the first place,  or to solve a 
problem with a service;  
 It neglects the entire shadow world of informal brokers and intermediaries 
and their relationships with local level politicians and bureaucrats (de Wit, 
1996, 2006; Ghafur, 2000; Kitscheld and Wilkinson 2007), which is 
precisely critical for the poor. Blundo, 2006, has written an article with the 
telling title ‘Dealing with the State, the Informal Privatisation of Street 
Level Bureaucracies in Senegal’, more details on this follow below. 
 Inadequate recognition of the essentially power dimension of 
accountability. 
 It neglects civil society (Evertzen, 2006); 
3 Problematising Accountability 
3.1. Stakeholders in Accountability relationships 
If accountability works in terms of the WDR accountability triangle, it assumes 
a (potentially effective) direct relationship between the citizen – and the service 
provider (the short route) as well as a (potentially effective) relationship 
between a citizen, the policy maker and the politician, who could pull up a 
non-performing service provider (the long route). By considering briefly the 
key stakeholders related to accountability, we take issue with most of these 
assumptions: many poor ‘clients’ do not have direct access to service providers 
- and if they have they have very little claims over them—partly as they do not 
actually have high expectations or ‘perceived entitlements’. Rather than 
complaining or getting angry, poor citizens may simply have to pay up if they 
really want good health care or a place in a proper school: bribing takes the 
place of ‘voice’ or ‘exit’. The long route is often ‘very long indeed’—the long 
and winding road  - if and when elected representatives and politicians never 
stop and look back at the poor voters who voted them into power – not rarely 
after ‘bribing’ them with presents and gifts (Kitscheld and Wilkinson 2007). 
One could wonder whether accountability is a concept with any meaning for 
masses of (very) poor people in developing countries. Let us consider the key 
stakeholders. 
 
Politicians 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to dwell in much detail with the role of 
politicians- besides, their diverse roles and activities vary widely from country 
to country, even from politician to politician. Nevertheless, some 
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generalisations can be made, none of them too positive about the willingness 
of politicians in many countries to actually fend for the interests of the poor 
and marginalised in many countries. Another issue is the dependency relations 
– however skewed – between politician and poor voters in many developing 
country democracies, where politicians only seek contact with the poor just 
before and during elections, and where the poor are motivated, requested or 
bribed to vote for a politicians. Often, relations between politicians and voters 
are personal and long term, and can be captured by the concept of ‘electoral 
clientelism’. Kitscheld and Wilkinson (2007:19) indicate that in many countries 
with high levels of poverty (Thailand, India, Pakistan and Zambia), ‘patrons 
directly purchase clients’ votes in exchange for money, liquor, clothes, food or 
other immediately consumable goods (…) Much more frequent than single-
shot transactions of this nature, however, are webs of exchange, obligation, 
and reciprocity sustained over a longer period, in which patrons provide 
private goods or club goods to their clients’. For the purpose of this paper it is 
important to underline that politicians may influence policy or policy benefits 
through discretionary powers towards poor clients or customers. One good 
example is provided by Ghafur (2000:269) who refers to the realities of slums 
in Dhaka ‘… very rarely have all communities been favoured equally. The ward 
commissioner’s aim, implicit in the resource allocation for development work 
(slum improvement) was to serve and ensure his existing vote banks. ‘On the 
surface, Slum Improvement Projects no doubt serves the cause of the poor, 
but in reality, service provision is also a patronage distribution effort which 
intends to secure the support of local power structure (and households) for the 
central government (ibid.:275). We are not saying that all politicians are always 
using their discretionary powers to manipulate and distort policies but we need 
to be realistic and perceive the risk that this does happen. Under such 
conditions, accountability is completely distorted, as politicians are not 
susceptible to regular democratic and governance objectives and expectations. 
 
Officials 
Little can be said here in a general way on the role and performance of 
officials, but again we attempt to stress the perspectives of the poor in many 
developing countries. One issue is obviously the incidence of administrative 
corruption in many developing countries, the result no doubt of many diverse 
causes, including poor or irregular payment of salaries, very poor systems of 
performance management, accountability, control and enforcement of 
organisational rules, connivance with rent-seeking politicians and just plain 
greed. Such corruption serves as an extra tax on the poor (or on whoever is in 
the sad position of not being able to take bribes). Even more complex are 
conditions in what are called neo-patrimonial states. In contrast to the triangle 
of accountability, one could juxtapose the Triangle of Accommodation (Migdal 
1988 in Brinkerhoff 2002, 19) which operates in neo-patrimonial states and 
where there is a tacit understanding and co-operation between bureaucrats, 
politicians and strongmen, leading to very weak (‘token’) implementation of 
official policy- and which links to the aforementioned statements on 
politicians. 
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Private sector service providers 
Increasingly, hitherto public tasks are undertaken by (semi) private actors as in 
New Public Management policies, and as part of neo-liberal agendas 
advocating a smaller state, which may imply increasing numbers of actors 
(which could include NGOs etc), and what is called ‘enabling’ (local) 
governments (Swijngedouw, 2005) . For all their merit, ultimately private sector 
providers (education, health, basic services, solid waste management) have a 
profit motive and this normally is in contradiction with the need for the poor 
to have a standard package of adequate services from the state. A large public 
sector is in principle in the interest of the poor – and less so of the rich. User 
fees, the increasing incidence of good quality private schools and hospitals 
which meet the demand of higher income groups who can pay the bills – all 
work against the interests of the poor, as the poor who can ill-afford them, and 
as there is less interest and investment in the public schools and hospitals 
which they have little choice to attend. These are all trends working against 
quality services for massive numbers of poor people. One might assume that 
accountability systems work better in market based service delivery 
arrangements: people who use these may be better informed and more 
assertive, they hence have choices and may be expected to demand value for 
money. 
 
Brokers and intermediaries 
The WDR 2004 assumes that state deals with service providers – in a compact 
– (often the state still is itself the provider) and that the providers work with 
the clients/ customers of the service. However, in reality, it appears as if 
brokers (mediators, intermediaries, local agents, touts, (demarcheurs, agents 
d’áffaires, transitaires ambulants) often fill the gap between people and the 
state, between people and the service providers (de Wit, 1996). Blundo 
2006:802) underlines the importance of brokers – with an informal and 
precarious status- as regards the delivery of services in Benin, Niger and 
Senegal. These are built around the relationships between public users and 
services in public transport, customers, administration, local taxation, public 
procurements, justice and public health services – including the issuing of birth 
certificates (ibid.: 810). He argues that they contribute to an ‘informal 
privatisation of the street level bureaucracy’. The brokers serve a function to 
the user as they can guide them through the maze of officials and layers to the 
right person, as well as informing the client of going rates of informal payment 
(they personalise the administrative procedure, speed up the procedures – but 
to the detriment of those not using brokers). Officials are tolerating the 
brokers, ‘because they constitute a protective shield for the misdeeds of the 
public agents’ (ibid.:816). Initiation at the level of the local bureaucracy is often 
done via genuine administrative brokers (office boys, ushers etc) – which is a 
strategy needed to control the non-formal codes, ‘which sometimes 
presupposes the development of a local know-how of corruption’.  
Brinkerhof (2002:11) argues that low income people may not see the use 
of mediators (or  clientelism generally)  in wholly negative terms; it may serve 
important functions for the poor in terms of an informal insurance system or 
as an important social safety valve – which they perceive as a reasonable 
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assessment of risk. This would fit a specific phase of development or state 
building. This is confirmed by de Wit (1996) who argues that patrons and 
brokers typically are ‘Janus-faced’, while demanding high fees for mediation 
they may be the only ones ready to successfully operate on behalf of the poor 
and illiterate, while alternating ‘exploitative activity’ with social and supportive 
activities as in providing presents and organising (temple) festivals. However, 
Brinkerhof agrees that patron-client systems have fewer countervailing powers 
or ‘agents of restraint’ (ibid.:12), which again links to lesser scope for 
accountability as there is no/ a lesser direct link between the poor, the service 
agency and the politician.  
 
Back to the poor: men and women 
As indicated, it is the poor and vulnerable who would have most to gain from 
an effective and strong public sector and a large public budgets- if these were 
spent well. As indicated, it is precisely the poor who often do not have access 
to public services, and if they do, these may be of much poorer quality than 
those for higher income groups. It is critical to make a distinction between 
men and women here, as women often again find it much harder to get access 
to proper education, health care, housing etc (Evertzen, 2006). And as 
accountability issues are closely linked to power, they also bear on the severe 
institutionalised inequalities which characterise many developing and transition 
countries. 
‘Many of the initiatives that profess to promote accountability, target only 
very ‘soft’ aspects of accountability…, treating the structural difficulties of 
democratic systems as temporary glitches requiring the application of technical 
expertise. Such initiatives side-step anti-poor biases that prevent accountability 
institutions from recognising and responding to injustices that 
disproportionally, or even exclusively, affect marginalised groups’ (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2004, in Newell, 2006:49). 
A second, more structural question, is whether actual practices of 
accountability will offer perspectives for more effective governance/ service 
delivery from the vantage point of the poor, or is it another buzz-word, 
launched in a desperate effort in a never ending quest to find the key to 
poverty reduction? One may wonder as to whether and how the concept 
relates to the actual realities of people in villages, cities and slums of 
developing countries- and how they would translate the term. Newell 
(2006:40), for example, mentions that the term accountability does not exist in 
Spanish. Besides, accountability is obviously also linked to issues of entitlement 
and expectations of people, and these may be rather low indeed. In the 
aforementioned slum project in Dhaka, Bangladesh the social construction of 
the collective expectation (of entitlement to patronage) contributes to the 
development of a specific hierarchy-patronage relationship between 
households and urban local government (Ghafur, 2000: 275). Within this 
relationship, the institutional format of the municipality does not even 
enfranchise households to claim legitimately required items of urban services 
for household reproduction.  
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3.2 Impressions from Netherlands Embassies on 
accountability in select countries4 
In the above, the accountability agenda from the perspective of the poor has 
been found rather problematic indeed - if they actually perceive it as an issue if 
questioned. However, it is also problematic from the donor agency point of 
view if the experiences of Netherlands Embassies in charge of development 
cooperation are considered. A survey was carried out amongst Netherlands 
Embassies into the nature of Embassy involvement in the country; the nature 
of service delivery arrangements and accountability mechanisms, and 
reflections on both ‘the short’ and the ‘long route’ of accountability 
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Some indicative findings from 
these Embassy reports on accountability and formal/informal institutions are 
listed here, including illustrative quotes from Embassy survey reports. 
 
Bangladesh:  ‘Without proper base-line data or monitoring systems, and 
considering the low level of decentralised responsibilities, and frequent 
transfers of government officials it is very difficult to establish mechanisms of 
accountability, let alone ensure that they are of good quality and functioning. 
Formal accountability institutions such as a well-functioning parliament and 
separation of powers are non-existing in Bangladesh……’ and: ‘The long route 
of accountability is a title perfectly on the spot – our experience is that it is an 
extremely tedious process’. 
 
Bolivia:  ‘Type-casting the nature of existing service delivery arrangements in 
the country can be done by the label pro-poor envisaged, but unresponsive by 
nature for this specific target group. Like in so many other countries, there is a 
big difference between the level of and access to service delivery for the 
different social strata’. 
 
Ethiopia: ‘Type casting the nature of service delivery in Ethiopia, the answer 
is two-fold: it is both pro-poor and clientelist, both decentralised and 
centralised and both responsive and unresponsive to consumer demand. Such 
dichotomies do exist side by side as a result of informal institutions. In 
principle, policies, guidelines and procedures in Ethiopia are generally well laid 
down. They are pro-poor and strongly equity-focused. So far, so good. But it is 
preferential treatment that blurs the picture, and invariably so, along lines of 
patronage, sex, ethnical lineage, political affiliation and the like. Poor people 
have extremely limited control over their means, limited access to power, and 
little voice’  
 
Ghana: (type casting service delivery) ‘Formally pro-poor but clientelism plays 
also an important role, e.g. water supply tends to be used by politicians to gain 
                                                 
4 Courtesy Floris Blankenberg of the DEK department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, who allowed referring to a survey amongst Embassy staff on informal 
institutions. 
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support and there is a tendency to provide water to middle/high income areas’  
…. ‘Traditional chiefs play a dubious role, they are not accountable and not all 
chiefs support pro-poor interventions or speak on behalf of the poor people’.  
 
Yemen: ‘It must be noted however that not much systematic information has 
been collected and published on informal accountability mechanisms such as 
local leaders (sheikhs) and their local power bases (including at times armies), 
traditional ‘institutions’ that are heavily male dominated like chewing qat in the 
afternoon’…. ‘These are un-transparent decision making mechanisms in a 
traditional society, which leaves out the opinion and participation of half the 
population, being the women of this country’. 
3.3 Modern/formal and Informal/Traditional Institutions 
This paper will make a distinction between ‘modern’ or ‘formal’ and 
‘traditional’ or ‘informal’ institutions and relationships, which both exist – 
sometimes side by side, sometimes in combination in developing and transition 
countries. Following Dia (1996) as well as a recent report by the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), 2007, formal institutions are defined as the 
‘modern’ institutions that have been constituted by law and common 
acceptance – such as banks, ministries, municipalities, (foreign funded) 
factories etc. Traditional or indigenous institutions and relationships – which 
are ‘informal’ as compared to the formal ones which are bound by formally 
enforceable rules and sanctions – have evolved over time in countries, are 
deeply rooted or embedded in local communities as well as in local culture. 
These may include caste-councils or the strong and inclusive organisations of 
fishing communities, but also informal micro-enterprises, saving groups or 
tribal chiefs, as for example in Ghana. For a more detailed assessment of such 
institutions and their relative merits and de-merits see de Wit (2006) and ECA, 
2007. It may be noted here that for all their possible merit, such ‘traditional’ 
‘indigenous’ or customary organisations and institutions also may harbour 
negative traits, for example that they are patriarchal and autocratic. Neither is it 
true that such institutions, even if very old and deeply rooted, are also purely 
‘traditional’ or that they have not changed in the course of history. For 
example, Maru (2006) indicates that in many parts of Africa traditional chiefs 
were used by colonial powers the help exploit colonies; it was then the chiefs 
who exploited their people. This has led to the concentration of much power 
in the hands of these chiefs, which may still persist up to the present day. 
We will not go into more detail here as regards further defining informal 
institutions with their many connotations, and rather refer to other 
publications which have taken up this topic (de Wit, 2006; Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004). Here, we will argue that in all developing countries  - and, for 
that matter also in rich, developed countries - both ‘modern’ ,‘formal’ and 
‘traditional’ and ‘informal’ institutions exist and co-exist, and that apparently 
quite modern and formal organisations may me influenced or permeated by 
traditional and indigenous values, norms and practices. Such juxtaposition and 
the incidence of ‘hybrids’ obviously occur in differing degrees of importance – 
varying from country to country, but also varying in importance for people – 
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which may be explained in terms of social class, caste, ethnic group or gender. 
It can be well argued that traditional saving groups in Africa and Asia are more 
important for the poor than for the middle classes who put their savings in 
banks. It is also obvious that (illiterate) poor people are more (urgently) 
dependent on local leaders, tribal chiefs or caste leaders than rich(er) people, 
who may be able to directly contact and put pressure on service delivery 
agencies, officials or politicians. Which, however, is not to deny that informal 
relations and channels are not important to them, if only as they may 
sometimes be more effective than direct formal relationships, or as they may 
add a personal element of trust in socio-economic conditions where trust and 
reliability are in short supply for all.   
However, we also argue that both ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ institutions 
may perform well or, in contrast, poorly in terms of accountability. One may 
have a ‘modern’ or formal system (e.g. ‘participatory budgeting in Porto 
Alegre’) which is quite accountable, works well by and large, and which is not 
influenced or distorted by corruption, elite or mafia- capture and other 
negative traits, and which includes effective accountability arrangements. 
Similarly, one may have a ‘traditional system’ for example the Adji Game in 
Benin (Oosterwaal, 2004) which has a high level of credibility, acceptable 
outcomes and where again corruption and elite capture seem relatively absent’. 
Logically, there will also be mixed forms, for example where governments or 
donor agencies have built on traditional institutions, for example the Gacaca 
courts in Rwanda, which is another example of a ‘working’ arrangement where 
justice is dispensed apparently to the satisfaction of many and in conditions of 
accountability. Indeed, there is often no clear line between what may be called 
‘formal’ or ‘indigenous’ institutions, but there is rather a continuum, where the 
two mix or overlap.  
In contrast, in all such organisations, institutions, relations and cases, 
things may not be well or go wrong - both in ‘modern’, traditional’ and ‘mixed 
types’. There may be corruption, elite capture, mafia domination, the 
marginalisation of the poor, women or certain ethnic groups – resulting in low 
or negative public appreciation, negative outcomes and little or no 
accountability. We shall show later that many arrangements relating to police 
forces in African countries basically do not work – leading to non-functioning 
accountability systems and a poorly performing police force. The common 
issue here is that they are ineffective and it is hard to otherwise capture such 
practices in one term, but there is a sense here of ‘illegal’, semi-legal, un-
desired, relating to deals, shady understandings, backroom politics, Mafiosi 
practices etc. This leads to the following matrix of nine boxes, which allow for 
the possibility accountability arrangements work or do not work both in 
‘modern’, ‘traditional’ and ‘mixed modern/traditional’ systems. 
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TABLE 1 
Dimensions of accountability in different institutional arrangements and countries:  
an overview 
 
 
 
 ‘Modern’ systems, 
following state rules and 
regulations 
‘Traditiona’, indigenous 
system, following local/ 
community logic 
Mixed ‘modern’ and 
indigenous system 
Rules are followed, 
there is popular 
support, people are 
by and large 
positive on 
outcomes; 
 
 
Largely effective 
 
 
 
 
Entrenched rules  
Paper 
Accepted norms  
* Decentralization of 
service delivery: Health 
- Rwanda 
* Decentralization of 
service delivery: 
Education systems in -  
Rwanda 
* Media campaign to fight 
corruption – Uganda 
* Local government 
decision making: 
Uganda and Kenya 
 
* The Adji game – 
Republic of Benin 
* Children Feedback 
Committees – 
Zimbabwe 
* Financial Services for 
Women Entrepreneurs 
(Susu) – Ghana 
* The Gacaca Courts – 
Rwanda 
* Conflict Resolution: 
Abunzi – Rwanda 
* Legal dualism: 
Paralegals – Sierra 
Leone 
* Traditional religion and 
fertility regulation – 
Ghana 
Mixed outcomes in 
terms of effective or 
ineffective 
accountability or 
performance 
* Maktab Police Tribunal 
for Junior officers – 
Tanzania 
* Disciplinary Courts and 
Human Rights 
Complaints  
* Desk of the Police – 
Uganda 
* Disciplinary trials for 
Junior officers – Kenya 
* Independent Complaints 
Directorate – South 
Africa Police Service 
* Dam/borehole 
committees – 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Rules are not 
followed, systems 
do not work as 
perceived by 
people, high 
incidence of illegal, 
irregular dynamics 
(corruption, elite 
capture etc.)  
 
Largely ineffective 
* Local Health Boards – 
Tanzania 
* The media law reform – 
Zimbabwe 
* Police reform – Nigeria 
 * Local Health Services 
Management 
Committees – Kenya 
 18
4 Case Studies of  Accountability in ‘Modern’, ‘Formal’ 
Systems 
4.1 Introduction 
Following a review of key concepts and relevant practices relating to 
accountability and ‘formal’ versus ‘indigenous’ institutions, we will now 
provide more details as well as an assessment of the various cases listed in the 
above table.  The in-depth study of case studies, brought out a pattern where 
cases could mostly with some confidence be characterised as ‘more or less 
successful’ or as ‘not quite successful’, and this is obviously also linked to scale. 
It is more likely that a short term, small scale project or intervention is 
effective, farther than a large scale, or even national policy implemented over 
several years.  
We will below deal with some of the former, smaller scale examples, but 
first focus on the mixed evidence from the literature on the vagaries of police 
reform in African countries: Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa. We 
will show that there can be no unequivocal classification of such reforms as 
either effective or in-effective: while they have been successful in terms of 
increasing accountability sometimes, they also failed at other times. Or, put 
differently, many of the reforms were excellent in form and contents, but, 
when they met with the actual – informal realities of power, inequality and 
corruption in the offices, things often did not work out. For all the good news 
and potential of the new structures and bodies, and against sources praising the 
reforms, there are also indications and accounts that things have not been 
sustainable. One key issue we found from our assessments of police 
accountability mechanisms is that complaints by the police (constables to 
senior staff) about police are not common – officers are unlikely to report 
misconduct by colleagues as it can lead to isolation within the workplace and 
even violent reprisal.  There is a culture of secrecy surrounding the complaints 
process and the police appear to consider discipline an exclusively internal 
matter. 
4.2 Failing accountability in African Police Forces 
In theory, the extent to which internal systems of accountability are effective 
will have a direct impact on the effectiveness of external civilian oversight 
structures to monitor police reform, and it is generally helpful if agencies are 
exposed to external mechanisms of accountability. A web of accountability is 
then created when these external institutions complement and reinforce 
internal mechanisms. Examples of external oversight bodies include the Public 
Service Commission which can look into allegations levelled against the Police 
Force in Nigeria  (Chukwuma, 2005); the Kenyan Anti-Corruption 
Commission (CHRI, 2006); the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) of 
South Africa (Masuku, 2005).  In Tanzania, it has been helpful that the police 
structure distinguishes between disciplinary or criminal offences, and that there 
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are different procedures for junior and senior officers; as a case in point there 
is the Maktab Police Tribunal for junior officers).   
 
Uganda 
In the Uganda Police, accountability is within the ambit of Disciplinary Code 
of Conduct. Disciplinary Courts and Human Rights Complaints Desks, which 
were set up by the Inspector General of Police receive and conduct 
investigations into all complaints of police misconduct.  The Police Act itself 
allows for a public complaints system where any member of the public can file 
a written complaint regarding bribery, corruption, oppression, intimidation, 
neglect, non-performance of duty or other police misconduct. There is a Code 
of Conduct that provides the legal basis for disciplining police personnel, but 
this does not recognize the principle of vicarious liability, which implies that 
senior officers cannot be held responsible for acts of junior officers. This has 
stifled accountability within the Police organization. So while there are sources 
and reports of praise for the elaborate network of internal accountability, 
recent reports indicate that many systems are plagued by a lack of 
transparency, a refusal to recognise vicarious responsibility, self rule, a 
protectionist police culture, and a lack of public trust. This is partly based on 
the discretion given to police courts to itself choose the penalties, and this 
obviously leaves room for impunity: the judge and jury are the police 
themselves.  
 
Kenya 
In the Kenya Police Force, junior officers can face disciplinary trials and 
records are kept essential for performance management of both junior and 
senior officers. Progressive management strategies are in theory in place, which 
revolve around five key principles – clarity, responsibility, transparency, 
visibility and empowerment.  Members of Parliament also have many 
opportunities for police oversight through question time, annual departmental 
reviews (e.g. budget allocation time), and by examining policing issues through 
the parliamentary committee system so as to promote police accountability. So 
on paper, this looks like a potentially strong system of accountability. 
However, in Kenya, police officers themselves recognise that they are getting 
away with indiscipline, abuse of power, corruption, and criminality. Added to 
this is the vague accountability procedure for senior officers.  And even while 
Kenya laws permit civil suits against the Police (CHRI Kenya, 2006), 
unfortunately, civil proceedings have not been as effective as they could be 
because sensitive cases are not prioritized, long delays are common, and 
complainants can find themselves the object of police intimidation. So, on 
balance, the above goes to show that internal mechanisms of accountability are 
not working. 
 
Tanzania 
In Tanzania, lack of a legislated right to information has made possible a 
culture of secrecy in the police force (CHRI Tanzania, 2006). A system is in 
place of police oversight through Local Councils, but this is problematic 
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because council members are untrained and unskilled in policing. In many 
cases they do not understand basic legal concepts and no human rights training 
is undertaken. Hence, existing internal and external accountability mechanisms 
are weak and ineffective, and the public does not trust that the police will 
handle their complaints fairly. Hence, in Tanzania, the lack of transparency 
involved with the implementation of the existing internal mechanisms (on 
paper) renders it ineffective. Besides, disincentives for junior officers to make 
complaints against senior officers, and the protective police culture compound 
the ineffectiveness of the internal accountability mechanisms.  
 
Nigeria 
A final case where, ostensibly, formal efforts are undertaken to improve police 
efforts to enhance performance and accountability– but with hardly any impact 
– could be the Nigerian Police force. While internal and external accountability 
mechanisms such as the Police Service Commission (PSC) and the Public 
Complaints Bureau do exist, these are under-funded and enjoy little support by 
the national and police leadership in the discharge of their functions. It was 
applauded that a vigorous campaign was mounted against corrupt police 
officers by the Nigerian Inspector General of Police in 2002. Yet, only two 
years later in 2004, the IGP/ Inspector General was himself convicted of 
corruption. Again later, the Police Force was cited in a World Bank document 
as one of the most corrupt public organizations in Nigeria. Right after the 
World Bank statement, the Police ‘responded’ by raising the amount of bribes 
collected by the police from motorists at illegal road blocks from N20 to N50 
(Ihenacio, 2004). Finally, in Nigeria there are eight Police Training Colleges 
which recruit and train 40,000 new police personnel per year under a special 
programme. However, this programme was not preceded by an assessment of 
the capacity and preparedness of the police training institutions in Nigeria to 
actually absorb and effectively train the new recruits. Hence, a new wave of 
half trained police graduates hit the streets every six months (ibid.). 
4.3 Other unsuccessful cases of ‘formal’ accountability 
systems 
Local Health Boards – Tanzania 
Another example where potentially promising ‘formal’ accountability 
mechanisms were introduced with disappointing outcomes concern the Local 
Health Boards in Tanzania. The system introduced Community 
Representatives on the local health boards to improve accountability, but it 
turned out that over time this committee did rarely – if ever hold consultations 
with the community. The Board members proved largely ineffective and in 
most cases were pro-government. The perception of individual board members 
on their role in local health boards (management committees) is mainly 
government-focused, largely based on the influence of being appointed to the 
board by government (Boon, 2005). Some board members misunderstand their 
role or position and rather function as individuals, than as representatives of 
the interests of groups that have a stake in health issues. Therefore, downward 
accountability to constituencies by way of regular consultations does not take 
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place. It may be concluded that the strong government position in 
accountability structures undermined the added value of the local management 
structures in terms of creating direct, effective links or systems of 
accountability between users and providers. 
4.4 Successful accountability in Uganda 
Participation in Rwanda 
Participatory processes can open up accountability mechanisms to represent 
broader segments of society, so making them more sustainable, effective, and 
equitable. In Rwanda, client power is developed by involving beneficiary 
communities as providers of information as regards the performance of service 
providers. For example, in the health sector, community members are 
appointed to serve on local health centre management committees. The 
Government provides political support for contractual health service delivery, 
and these ‘top-down’ efforts are complimented by an active citizenry. 
Community representatives on health centre management committees are 
relied on to verify the records (invoices etc) submitted by service providers for 
payments, in addition to providing information on performance of service 
providers.  Health providers’ pay depends on the number of clients handled, a 
situation that has increased client power (Government of Rwanda, 2005).  
Similarly, in the educational sector, parents and communities are now involved 
in the management of schools (for example through the Parents and Teachers 
Associations) and the direct transfer of capitation grants to schools has given 
school managers some reasonable power to plan and manage expenditure. 
 
Media campaign to fight corruption in Uganda 
In Uganda, several newspapers supported an anti-corruption campaign by 
publishing information on public funds both in English and local dialects to 
monitor how local officials handle the education grant programme. This 
encouraged active citizens, many of them parents to respond positively by 
making sure their children were enrolled in schools where the nature and size 
of capitation grants are publicised. Hence, in Uganda, the media, particularly 
local radio stations, have helped to build accountability at the local level (Devas 
and Grant, 2003; Reinikka and Svensson, undated).  Mayors and chairpersons 
of councils participate in local phone-in radio programmes where citizens can 
question them about the use of money, and this has helped to build local 
accountability. Upward accountability to the national government has been 
strengthened through an elaborate system of reporting and monitoring on the 
use of resources and other performance measures, which forms critical 
information that feeds into the process of decision making on future grant 
allocations. All in all, there appear to be multiple opportunities for citizens to 
contribute/participate in decision-making (Devas and Grant, 2003).   
Finally, there are indications that also in Kenya committed and effective 
local leadership does exist at the local level (ibid.). This may have led to the 
external assistance provided by GTZ to promote Local Authority 
Development Plans and other initiatives. At the local level, a remarkable 
development of civil society took place, and a growing capacity of community 
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organizations could be noticed, where people organized not only for mutual 
self-help but also to demand more from their Local Authorities. Civil Society 
Organisations have started to create dialogue between Local Authorities and 
other stakeholder groups within their jurisdictions. 
5 Accountability in Informal Institutions 
Not surprisingly in this globalising world, it proved relatively difficult to 
identify cases which could be classified as relatively clear cases of ‘traditional’ 
or ‘indigenous’ institutions. Two cases of indigenous institutions – the Adji 
social club (Hounkonnou, 2001) and Water Borehole Committees (Kozanayi, 
2002) were examined. Common to these two are the fact that they are small, 
compact, local level institutions which performance thrives on mutual trust and 
solidarity, which is again established on cultural links. What makes the 
mechanisms of accountability governing these institutions effective appear to 
include the following factors: flexibility of rules; less costly to operate or 
maintain; they utilize the existing local structures; and appear less intrusive as 
regards the lives of local people. Such indigenous institutions have peculiar 
mechanisms of accountability which makes the operations of services they 
deliver or the management of communally-owned resources relatively 
successful, at least according to our (secondary) sources. 
 
The Adji game in Benin 
The Adji game in Benin is a local and indigenous savings and credit system. 
The procedure for applying for loans from the Adji club is low threshold and 
simple – applicants are required to fill a half-page form to secure loan, which 
compares very favourable to the many pages, and the collaterals required by 
the formal lending institutions. The system is based on face-to-face contacts, 
and the local club committee members are less intrusive as regards insisting on 
obtaining information on the purpose for which loan obtained is to be used 
for. Each member of the Adji game club who has made regular monthly 
contributions is eligible for one-time interest free loans; a second loan attracts 
interests. 1 It may however be noted that both management and membership 
of the system is relatively simple, as the beneficiaries of the Adji loan scheme 
are mostly males and cotton growers who by the nature of their vocation have 
come together to form the ‘club’ where they contribute monthly dues. 
Another but more ambiguous example concerns the local borehole 
committees in the arid rural areas of Zimbabwe. These are set up to monitor 
those who collect water by making sure that local people who pay maintenance 
fees or who helped in the constructions of boreholes have first or regular 
access to the water point.  In times of water scarcity, (unwritten) social 
contracts and kinship ties are important. Rules are bent to accommodate those 
who come from outside the community to collect water.  This is based on the 
premise that water is a God-given asset that should not be denied others; and 
that next-of-kin or other people from nearby communities cannot be denied 
access when they are in search of water. The system of borehole committees 
also illustrates the building on existing local structures. Community headmen 
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are called on as arbitrators or adjudicators in cases of community members 
who flout rules of water collection.  Complex cases can be referred upwards to 
the ward councillor; but the borehole committees try as much as possible not 
to refer cases to ‘civil servants’ who are generally regarded as slow in dealing 
with cases because they have no understanding or appreciates little of the 
traditional, local arrangements, and who seen to be encumbered with too many 
rules. Citizens are active participants and they serve voluntarily in committees 
with little or no financial reward, which reduces the costs of overheads. The 
inclusion of local leaders in borehole committees helps to prevent conflicts 
because they may ultimately define who has access to and the right to use 
which well.  Decision-making is relatively fast, compared to the long-winding 
routes of ‘formal’, ‘modern’ systems, with all their rules and bureaucracy.  
However, complications evolved as regards the borehole committees due 
to the involvement of donor agencies. They felt that some localities continued 
to suffer water scarcity because of un-regulated access to water by 
unauthorized persons in beneficiary communities. This made the donors sunk 
boreholes, and to superimpose their own borehole committees to manage the 
boreholes.  However, this superimposition resulted in conflicts because the 
newly established committees lacked synergy with the pre-existing local/ 
indigenous institutions which could have easily managed communally-owned 
water resources.  For example, the new committees created bottlenecks which 
excluded outsiders (those who did not pay maintenance fees), yet traditionally 
the local people regard water as a God-given resource that should not be 
denied to others; access denial is greatly resented by the community (Kozanayi, 
2002). This case illustrates the frequent problems where outsiders – be they 
donor agencies, NGOs or national governments – start to relate to such 
(relatively) traditional, small scale community arrangements. More often than 
not, the very act of entering the community with plans, proposals – and 
certainly money or other tangible opportunities – upsets a community and may 
undermine what might have been well performing arrangements. There are 
many cases where outsiders super-imposed new (‘’formal’) committees onto 
communities, sidelining the ‘traditional’ ones, which might have been less 
effective from a project point of view, but which might have been the ‘natural’, 
home grown and locally rooted organisations (cf. de Wit, 2001, on a slum 
project where ultimately donor efforts to establish partnerships and 
community wide participation proved futile. Slum people used the project as a 
vehicle to get access to municipal agencies, and after project completion people 
fell back on pre-existing local organisations and their vertical relations of 
patronage). 
6 Accountability in ‘mixed’ types of  institutions 
Effective Accountability in mixed ‘traditional’ and formal/ modern 
institutions’ 
We now focus on a few cases which represent the probably most common 
type of institution in developing countries, which are those that have originated 
way back in the past with strong roots in local culture and tradition, but which 
have adjusted over time to the vagaries as well as opportunities related to 
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contextual and institutional change: in norms and values, in new rules and laws 
in local or central governance, and in ‘modernisation’ as often associated with 
globalisation and donor projects and policies. The summarized cases below 
illustrate how local beliefs, values and norms that have been adapted to formal 
modern institutions over the years offer a framework that illustrates how 
service delivery can be tapped and accentuated.  These examples show that the 
‘traditional’ institutional environment can be used as a driving force to create 
an enabling environment for change or adaptation where necessary to adjust to 
modern economic and socio-demographic change.  Many local and informal 
institutions have mutated in response to changes brought in from the rest of 
the world.  For example, the Susu savings system for market women in Ghana 
has been adapted to modern banking and financial institutions; the Gacaca is 
now recognized and widely used under the formal justice system in Rwanda; 
and Social Action Funds introduced by the World Bank in Malawi and 
Tanzania makes use of existing local and traditional structures to achieve 
modest successes. 
 
The Gacaca Courts – Rwanda 
Active citizenry: as jurors and witnesses at the village level prosecution of 
perpetrators of genocide in the presence of 100 members of a general assembly 
in the community.  Gacaca is cheaper, quicker and easier to use than the 
formal justice system. Member of the Gacaca jury are not paid salaries but are 
given free medical assistance and schooling for their children.  The 
Government of Rwanda and donors provide funding for Gacaca activities 
through a Gacaca basket fund.  Monitoring and evaluation of the programme 
is also carried out by a consortium of development partners including 
Rwandan NGOs under the sponsorship of a group of Belgian NGOs.  The 
Gacaca Courts are coordinated at the national level by the National Service for 
Gacaca Courts under the Ministry of Justice, headed by an Executive Secretary.  
High profile cases that could not be resolved at the local level are taken up by 
the Ministry of Justice. 
Each Gacaca court has a tribunal of 14 persons of integrity labelled as 
Inyangamugayo, are selected from the community.  Nine of these are 
functioning members while five are on standby.  Selfless service is rendered by 
Gacaca jury members, typified by their willingness to work on voluntary basis.  
They are not paid salaries or allowances, but the government provides them 
with special welfare services such as free medical assistance and schooling for 
their children from the national budget through the National Service for 
Gacaca Courts (NSGC) (Government of Rwanda, 2005). However, while 
many support the Gacaca system as a relatively acceptable system to allow for 
justice and reconciliation in a post-genocide society (and even to empower 
women), there are also concerns as to the implications of the system, for 
example to actually capture and punish the right people, whether it 
compromises on international principles of human rights and criminal law, and 
the consequences of victims (often women) living amongst confessed 
perpetrators (Blizzard, 2006).   
Similarly in Rwanda, a traditional mechanism to deal with local conflict 
resolution exists by name of Abunzi. Its mandate is normally limited to settle 
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relatively smaller financial disputes (an upper limit of Euro 4,300 is 
mentioned). The Abunzi consists of a panel of 12 members, who are persons 
of integrity and who are elected by their community. Each trial is handled by a 
panel of three judges. It is perceived to be a fair and cheap justice system. Most 
importantly, the system promotes cultural values which enhance reconciliation 
among aggrieved parties (Government of Rwanda, 2005).  
 
Financial Services for Women Entrepreneurs (Susu) – Ghana 
This indigenous money saving system among market women is merged with 
modern day financial institutions, where Susu operators deposit the money 
collected from market women in designated banks, which yields some interests 
and ensure better returns (albeit marginal) on the amount deposited.  Other 
benefits include the guaranteed safety of deposits, accessibility to loan schemes 
for market women recognized as members of any of the Susu groups.  Peer 
pressure encourages market women to maintain regular deposits. Similarly, the 
homogeneity of the membership of Susu savings system in Ghana is based on 
the needs of market women who by the nature of their vocation needed a 
scheme to save their daily profits 
 
Children Feedback Committees in Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe, community engagement in decisions on how to implement a 
food aid programme sponsored by Save the Children (UK) thrived because of 
community engagement – in this case, the involvement of children.  The 
involvement of young people in assessing the value of the agency’s work was 
aimed at creating better accountability towards communities that benefited 
from the food aid programme.  Children Feedback Committees (CFC) 
provided the agency with a previously undocumented glimpse into what 
happens in households after aid is delivered (McIvor and Myllen, 2005).  
 
Social Action Funds in Tanzania and Malawi 
The Social Action Funds programme in Tanzania (Lenneiye, 2005) and Malawi 
(Kalanda, 2006) also became successful partly due to the engagement of some 
members of the recipient communities in Community Management 
Committees.  These committees were charged with management of the funds 
which made them accountable to the community, in addition to making 
implementation of the programme transparent.  In Malawi, the local 
leadership, with assistance from the Local Authorities (LAs) was charged with 
selection of beneficiaries.  In all LAs, beneficiaries, local, religious and political 
leaders were sensitized about the Public Works Programme – Conditional Cash 
Transfers (PWP-CCT) and its procedures.  The PWP-CCT was a programme 
within the existing Social Action Fund project to transfer cash income to 
vulnerable households to enable them to buy food and agricultural inputs for 
the 2005/2006 growing season. The overall lesson learnt in the implementation 
of the Social Action Funds programme in Tanzania and Malawi is that, where 
there is a common purpose, a clear goal and with adequate funding, Local 
Authorities can effectively and efficiently deliver large interventions at 
community level. 
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The Navrongo Family Planning delivery project 
The Navrongo Family Planning delivery project of the Population Council 
(NY) in northern Ghana has been moulded into the shape of rural, traditional 
African life – village-based and structured through a strong system of kinship 
groups and inter-group networks (Oosterwaal, 2004).  To harness this network 
resource, the Navrongo Project office had to gain the support of the village 
chiefs, elders, and peer network leaders to mobilize a tradition of social 
cooperation called Zurugelu, that gave credence to modern family planning 
and reproductive health programmes. 
7 Conclusions 
We will now present some tentative conclusions, based on the evidence 
provided on the cases that were presented in this paper, but also on other cases 
and documentation not taken up here (see the Annex 1 for an overview of 
more cases that were analysed). The focus is on accountability in a variety of 
‘traditional/informal’, ‘modern’ and ‘mixed’ systems, institutions and 
arrangements where we have deliberately problematised these concepts, as they 
have multiple meanings that need to be contextualised carefully. This paper has 
confirmed our initial assumption that, rather than starting from clear and 
separable categories, it is better to speak of a gliding scale from a general 
situation where almost all systems are hybrid, mixed forms of ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ and from the ‘informal’ to the ‘formal’ – and moreover constantly 
in a state of flux. This also shows in the relative absence  in our sample of 
‘pure’ traditional institutions with working or not working accountability 
mechanisms; globalisation, modernisation and the penetration of the nation 
state and donor-led programmes has been so thorough and encompassing that 
pure ‘traditional’ systems seem to have by and large disappeared; if they survive 
they have been kept alive or given new life by national/local governments or 
donor agencies, and they combine modern traits as well as having (deep) roots 
in tradition, culture and community, somehow bridging and fixing the divide 
between structure and agency.  
Accountability itself was shown to be a complex concept: not only does it 
refer to answerability, but also to the scope for penalties if actions by service 
providers or policy makers lead to justified dissatisfaction. It is a relationship 
and as such it is influenced by power and information, as well as by the 
number of people involved: which can be policy makers and politicians, but 
also sub-contractors, the private sector involved in service delivery and 
mediators.  The value of the concept was contested with a view to the reality of 
livelihood and access of the poor in developing countries where intermediaries, 
bribes and informal deals like exchanging a vote for a service are much more 
common than poor ‘clients’ asserting ‘rights’ or ‘lodging a complaint’ with an 
agency or politician.  
To compound this complexity, we may note that the analysis was made 
difficult due to the problems to clearly distinguish between the various cases 
and arrangements. Key distinctions here are: large scale (as for example 
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national police accountability systems) versus small scale (borehole 
committees). In the below analysis we will to order systems as in community 
based on the one hand, and of higher levels on the other. Another distinction 
is between type of service or benefit provided, which has been shown to range 
from water (boreholes), citizen security (policy), justice (Gacaca courts) to 
credit (Adji Game). Obviously, accountability takes on different forms in such 
different areas, and relates to different requirements and sanctions.  
We have been unable by and large to probe the nature and implications of 
inequality and poverty within the cases studied: we have mostly considered the 
groups and persons involved in cases as relatively homogeneous - which was 
partly necessitated by the use of secondary sources. Much more study is 
required to carefully map the variegated accountability relationships per socio-
economic category - for example the assumption that (well educated and well 
informed) middle class persons can hold officials accountable - in a context 
where this is expected and acceptable even to officials. This may be much less 
the case for poor persons, who lack information, who may not know whom to 
approach with a complaint, or who may be chased away once they found the 
right location, the time and the courage. This need for much more detailed 
research is now commonly recognised, for example by the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) which has a publication series which 
deliberately aim at looking ‘behind the façade’, in an awareness that donors 
may miss the actual realities of poor communities and policy networks which 
may be largely informal and embedded in or influenced by tradition and local 
values. The ECA report (2007:24) argues that African traditional institutions 
are understudied and misunderstood and it strongly advocates that more 
research is carried out on such institutions and their implications for issues like 
governance, gender and land tenure.   
The first point to make then is that we need to discern between small scale 
or community arrangements and large scale systems or institutions, as in the 
National police of the nationwide Gacaca criminal justice system in Rwanda. 
Obviously, accountability (as in answerability) is more likely at the community 
level, and becomes more diffuse in larger scale arrangements. This is not to say 
that accountability works out well in community or local systems. It does seem 
to work for example in the Adji savings and credit system, with lots of face-to-
face relationships, and a decentralised system of management and control, 
where enforcing penalties are easy to understand (defaulting) and to enforce. 
More generally, accountability in such conditions is more likely: it fits better 
with local level conditions and people (are and can be allowed to) influence 
their own affairs at the local level.  Most of the time, the rules are not written 
down, yet everybody is aware of their existence and may live by them, while 
(the possibility of sanction) act as a deterrent. The rules are not costly to 
enforce and they seem applicable and malleable to local conditions as they 
occur in order to accommodate change and have uncertain situations catered 
for. An implicit belief may exist that at the formal level (e.g. dealing with civil 
servants for arbitration); penalties or sanctions are inimical to local unity 
because it breeds little or no reconciliation among aggrieved members of the 
community. Local level arrangements may also be less intrusive, especially in 
indigenous institutions, where the strengths and weaknesses of individual 
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members are known to all, yet the less endowed ones may not be excluded 
from using the system (existing inequalities among members do not become a 
barrier for denial of service or participation in local programmes).  In the Adji 
game set-up of Benin, the loan committee of the local club is less intrusive 
about the purpose for which an applicant is going to use loan for, which refers 
to a common fund of trust, as well as long standing relations between local 
people. Finally, such systems may be less bureaucratic.   
However, to contrast this relatively positive assessment, we must assume 
division in all communities, and it is likely that here too issues of power and 
in/exclusion operate. The cases we assessed do not allow for checking 
accountability by gender, by politics (for example membership of a ruling 
political party may greatly ease things), or generally by power. Yet, there are 
indications that, at the community level there is little doubt that accountability 
is sometimes seen as a dangerous political concept that can undermine local 
hierarchies. Traditional power structures can feel threatened by providing 
encouragement to normally docile community members to question the 
assistance that is delivered to them. So, here too it all depends on the openness 
of the powers-that-be: even in local arrangements there can be a backlash 
against too strong demands of transparency and proper service delivery. This 
obviously is related to issues of culture, authority, and respect, where autocratic 
local leaders – caste elders, tribal chiefs – may demand respect and are unlikely 
to allow much scrutiny of their actions, let alone to suffer penalties if things do 
wrong. 
 Things are much more problematic in large scale arrangements and 
systems, as was brought out in our assessment of police performance and 
accountability in African countries. Even while on paper accountability systems 
and penalties exist, they crumble and fail when they meet the actual realities of 
power, inequality and corruption in the offices. It is not only that the public 
cannot hold police officers accountable, complaints inside the police force are 
rare – incentives are such that officers are unlikely to report misconduct by 
colleagues as it can lead to isolation within the workplace and even violent 
reprisal.  There is a culture of secrecy surrounding the complaints process and 
the police appear to consider discipline an exclusively internal matter. 
Obviously, issues of power dominate accountability relations: lower level 
officials will be reluctant to focus their superiors – as in any developing 
country hierarchy, including ministries and municipalities—and complaints are 
more likely from rich and well connected citizens than from a poor man or 
woman who pays bribes for ‘illegally’ squatting or hawking.  
By and large then, there appears to be no clear pattern as to whether 
accountability is more effective in ‘traditional’, ‘modern’, or ‘mixed’; systems. If 
accountability is more likely in the two cases listed under ‘traditional’ 
arrangements (Adji Game and the Zimbabwe borehole committees) it may be 
explained by their small scale and relatively focused, specialised activities. This 
finding is confirmed by the ECA report (2007: 3-4) which argues that 
accountability is more likely in decentralised systems.  
One issue to consider is how governments and donor agencies have dealt 
with traditional institutions: have they discarded them, reconciled them to their 
purposed, maintain them as they were or even revived them if previously well 
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performing organisations have disappeared?  There are cases where traditional 
institutions survive/are revived as in the case of the FIS (family clans) in 
Albania, and the Abunzi in Rwanda. There may be deliberate attempts to 
support hybrid systems, as in the case of the Sierra Leone Paralegals (Maru, 
2006) and the Susu collectors in Ghana. There are of course those (many) 
cases where donors imposed new/modern organisations conflicting with 
existing/ traditional ones, as in Zimbabwe (McIvor and Myllenen, 2005), and 
in the Bangalore Urban Poverty Program (de Wit, 2001). But there are also 
cases where traditional arrangements work out worse than formal systems and 
cases where context proved acceptable to the people. 
Common issues that seem to explain the more effective accountability 
systems include: 
 Small is beautiful: accountability is more likely in relatively smaller, 
decentralised contexts where regular face-to-face interactions are likely. 
However, there are no guarantees (as for example the mixed evidence on 
decentralisation shows, or when a local leader, caste elder or chief happens to 
be quite autocratic and/or patriarchal).   
 An active role of local and national politicians who are willing to support 
open and free systems of accountability. 
  Participatory processes can open up accountability mechanisms to 
represent broader segments of society making them more sustainable, 
effective, and equitable, but again one needs to be aware of the risks of 
community divisions, gate keepers and elite capture. 
 Successes of formal accountability mechanisms also depend on peculiar 
methods used in conducting assessments/appraisals of service delivery by 
organizations.  In Uganda, the media, particularly local radio stations, have 
helped to build accountability at the local level. 
 Obviously, the absence of the rule of law has an obvious strong negative 
impact on accountability arrangement, as brought out by Assessments of 
Police accountability mechanisms in East Africa. A culture of secrecy 
surrounding the complaints process may develop, and the police may consider 
discipline an exclusively internal matter. 
 Well performing systems of representation are critical. In Tanzanian local 
health boards some board members function as individuals rather than as 
representative of the interests of groups that have a stake in health issues. In 
such flawed systems of representation, downward accountability to 
constituencies by the way of regular consultations or claim making does not 
take place. 
 Indigenous or traditional local institutions have peculiar mechanisms of 
accountability which may make the operations of services they deliver or the 
management of communally-owned resources successful.  They have in 
common that they are small, compact, local level institutions whose functions 
thrive on mutual trust and solidarity established on cultural links.  What makes 
such mechanisms of accountability effective include factors such as flexibility 
of rules; low operational costs; starting from existing local structures and 
patterns of culture (organisation, shared norms) and that they are less intrusive 
into lives of local people. For example, the failure to pay attention to local 
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cultures – such as kinship and social structure – reduced the effectiveness of a 
food aid response to a famine situation in Sudan. 
 Despite some clear advantages, ‘traditional/ informal’ or mixed 
institutions also have drawbacks.  As already noted, they often harbour 
dysfunctional practices such as discrimination on the basis of gender and age, 
and/or domination in terms of patriarchy and aristocracy/elites. 
The summarized cases presented in this paper capture how local beliefs, values 
and norms that have been adapted to formal modern institutions over the years 
offer a framework that points at ways as to how service delivery can be 
improved and better organised as per the demands of people – rich and poor.  
Some examples have shown that a traditional institutional context can be a 
driving force to create an enabling environment for change or adaptation, 
which may sometimes be needed to adjust to modern economic and social 
change. They point to existing patterns and expectations of accountability 
which is given shape in diverse ways.  
Many local and traditional institutions have mutated in response to 
changes brought in from the rest of the world.  For example, the Susu savings 
system for market women in Ghana has been adapted to modern banking and 
financial institutions; the Gacaca is now recognized and widely used under the 
formal justice system in Rwanda; and Social Action Funds introduced by the 
World Bank in Malawi and Tanzania makes use of existing local and traditional 
structures to achieve modest successes.  
To conclude, we may note that, to perform effectively in terms of 
accountability, institutions have to be both rooted in the local context and 
culture and open to outside challenges and influences.  Attempting to work 
around local norms with technocratic targeting approaches has proved to be 
fruitless and inefficient.  Rather than using a one-size-fits-all method, it is 
better to understand the cultural logic of why certain decisions were being 
made by a community or population group, and to work with people to find 
solutions to local problems.   
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 APPENDICES 
ANNEX 1 
 Matrix: examples of the analysis of various cases 
(We only show 1 sheet out of 8): Mechanism of accountability: Justice 
Cases Defining features 
 Who: Agents - 
Principals 
Upward/ 
Downward 
Long/short route 
Vertical – 
horizontal 
Who’s/what 
accountability 
is being 
sought: 
Where:  
Local, 
Regional, 
national 
 
How  
 
Clarity of rules/norms: 
Formal, 
Informal, 
Quality/performance 
indicators 
Penalty/sanctions 
De facto 
De jure 
 
Ex post 
Ex ante 
 
Role of 
politicians 
(if any) 
Accountability 
conditions: 
Active citizenry, 
Political support, 
Financial support 
 
Role of women  
Part of 
process, 
Gender 
neutral, 
Neglected 
Government of 
Rwanda: 
Decentralisation 
and Service 
Delivery in 
Rwanda – The 
Gacaca courts 
Citizens (rural 
areas); vertical 
(government and 
the court; court 
and the people), 
short route 
Perpetrators of 
genocide – 
trials 
conducted 
under the long 
held traditional 
justice system 
of the Gacaca 
Local (grass-
root level), 
national 
Suspects in 
detention for 
suspected acts of 
genocide are 
arraigned before 
the Gacaca 
tribunal in their 
villages to face 
court juries elected 
from the 
community 
Informal: Gacaca is a 
local tribunal of 14 
persons 
Formal: now registered 
as National Service for 
Gacaca Courts under the 
Ministry of Justice 
De facto: those who 
willingly confess 
serve prison terms 
or split time doing 
community 
development 
Ex post None Active citizenry: jurors, 
witnesses. Jurors get 
free medical assistance 
& schooling for 
children. LG does 
community 
mobilisation. M&E 
carried out by 
development partners 
Part of the 
process 
(women form 
majority of 
survivors so 
they are 
essential 
witnesses and 
jurors) 
Government of 
Rwanda (2005): 
Decentralisation 
and Service 
Delivery in 
Rwanda – The 
Abunzi 
Citizens; 
horizontal 
(between the 
court and the 
citizens) 
Mechanism to 
use culturally 
acceptable  
values and 
norms for 
conflict 
resolution and 
reconciliation       
Local Traditional dispute 
resolution body on 
cases related to 
land, domestic 
violence & civil 
cases valued not 
more than €4300 
equivalent 
Informal: standard 
committee- twelve 
persons of integrity 
elected locally; operates 
once a week, on a 
voluntary basis 
Formal: now recognized 
by a law passed in 2004 
De facto Ex post None Active citizenry: 
committee members ( 
as judges &witnesses; 
trained by MINJUST; 
fair, cheap, promotes 
cultural values 
Few women 
judges 
Maru (2005), 
Human Rights 
and Justice 
Sector Reform in 
Africa: Legal 
dualism in Sierra 
Leone 
Citizens; vertical 
(between the 
paralegals and 
the people; 
paralegals and 
the formal justice 
system), short 
route,  
Provision of 
basic legal 
services in five 
chiefdoms in 
Sierra Leone 
Local, regional 
(chiefdoms) 
Community-based 
paralegals provide 
legal assistance 
for locals in 
customary courts  
Paralegals appointed 
from chiefdoms where 
they work and have 
grown up under 
customary law.  
Formal: They also get 
trained in formal law & 
work in tandem with 
police on crimes not in 
jurisdiction of customary 
courts e.g. rape 
De facto: contextual 
fine payments, 
expedition of service 
delivery where a 
complainant has 
been delayed 
Ex post None Paralegals fill the void 
of lawyers in customary 
courts in rural 
chiefdoms. Formal legal 
system is sometimes 
invoked to check 
unfairness, exploitation, 
and precedent-setting 
ruling in the customary 
courts. 
Part of process 
 
